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ABSTRACT
We explore the effects of environmental taxes that imprecisely target pollution.  A
review of actual policies indicates few (if any) examples of a true tax on pollution.  More
typically, environmental taxes target an input or output that is correlated with pollution.  We
construct a simple analytical general equilibrium model to calculate the optimum tax rate on
the input of the polluting industry, in terms of key behavioral parameters, and we compare this
imprecisely-targeted tax to an ideal tax on pollution.  Finally, we consider incremental tax
reforms such as a change in either tax from some pre-existing level.  Using a utility-based
money-metric measure of welfare, we examine the losses that arise from not taxing pollution
directly.  With no existing tax, under our plausible parameters, the welfare gain from an output
tax is less that half the gain from an emissions tax.
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A tax per unit of pollution can induce all the cheapest and most efficient
forms of pollution abatement (Pigou, 1932). To reduce its tax liability, the firm can
switch to a less-polluting fuel, add a scrubber, change disposal methods, or
otherwise adjust its production process. These methods of substitution in production
reduce the pollution per unit of output. In addition, the tax raises the overall cost of
production, so the higher equilibrium output price chokes off demand for the output.
Thus the tax has a "substitution effect" that reduces pollution per unit, and an
"output effect" that reduces the number of units.
Yet few actual taxes are targeted directly on pollution (Barthold, 1994).
Taxes on gasoline are prevalent around the world, and the use of gasoline is indeed
correlated with vehicle emissions. This gas tax might provide some incentive to
reduce emissions by driving less, but it provides no incentive to reduce emissions per
gallon (such as by adding pollution control equipment). The United States taxes
chemical feedstocks associated with contaminated Superfund sites, and this tax may
help reduce pollution, but it provides no incentive to use a cleaner production
process, to avoid spills, or to use any other method of reducing pollution perunit of
chemical input (Fullerton, 1996). In Europe, some industrial effluent taxes are
calculated using an assumed industry-wide rate of effluent per unit output, so the
firm cannot reduce its tax by reducing its own effluent per unit (Hahn, 1989). These
taxes miss the substitution effect.
In this paper, we measure the welfare effect of improperly-targeted
instruments. We build a simple analytical general equilibrium model with
substitution in production and demand by consumers, and we derive second-best-2-
optimal tax rates on emissions or on output. These rates are based on preference
parameters, technological parameters, and pre-existing tax rates. We discuss these
optimal tax rates, and then we choose plausible values of the parameters to calculate
the effects of a small change in each tax rate. For alternative initial conditions, we
use the model to calculate the cost of missing the target: the welfare gain from a
targeted tax on emissions minus the gain from an imperfectly-targeted tax on output
of the polluting industry.
Actual taxes may miss the target for several reasons. First, actual policy may
not fully appreciate the importance of hitting the target. Policymakers may have
been concerned primarily with equity considerations, trying to ensure that polluting
industries are made to pay for pollution --withoutrealizing that the form of these
taxes affect incentives to reduce pollution. Second, actual emissions may be difficult
or impossible to measure. In these cases, the best available tax may apply to a
measurable activity that is closely correlated with emissions. To reduce vehicle
emissions, for example, the gasoline tax may be the best available instrument.
Third, the technology of emission measurement is improving over time.
Policymakers may be slow to adjust the tax base to reflect the newly-reduced cost of
measuring a particular pollutant.
We do not measure or model the costs of targeting the tax on pollution, that
is, the costs of measurement, monitoring, and enforcement. We only measure the
benefits of properly targeting the tax. Thus our results can be taken as a measure of
the importance of developing new measurement or enforcement technologies and of
reforming the law to take advantage of those technologies. That is, we calculate the
improvement over an output tax that can be obtained by a targeted tax on pollution
that can capture the substitution effect as well as the output effect.-3-
The next section reviews actual environmental taxes around the world and
describes the extent to which they miss the target. The following section reviews
existing economic literature on this subject. Most early economic models ignored
the substitution effect, assuming that pollution was associated only with output.
More recently, others model substitution in production but assume that the emissions
tax is fully available. Schmutzler and Goulder (1997) provide a partial equilibrium
model of the difference between an output tax and an emissions tax, Our paper
contributes to this literature by providing a general equilibrium model to compare
the welfare effects of these taxes.
If emissions cannot be monitored at reasonable cost, and policy is limited to a
tax on the output of the polluting industry, then how should that tax rate be set? One
might think that the imperfection of this blunt instrument would reduce the optimal
rate of tax.
In our results section, we show that is not the case: the second-best output tax should
be set to capture the exact same output effect that would have been captured by the
emissions tax. If the unavailable emissions tax would have raised output price by 12
percent, for example, then the output tax should be set to 12 percent. We also solve
for the optimal emissions tax in a second-best world with some fixed pre-existing
output tax.
Finally, we use plausible parameters to calculate the incremental effects on
welfare of slight increases in any pre-existing output tax or emissions tax, and we
show the "welfare gap." We find that the welfare gain from an initial emissions tax
is more than twice the gain from an initial output tax. This cost of missing the target
does not depend on the size of the pre-existing output tax, or on the size of the
elasticity of substitution in utility, but it does depend on the elasticity of substitution-4-
in production. A larger ability to substitute between emissions and otherinputs in
production substantially raises the importance of hitting the target.
II. Environmental Taxes Around the World
While the economics literature has long championed theuse of market-based
instruments (e.g. environmental taxes and tradable permits), most countrieshave
long relied on a system of regulations including command and controlregulations.
In the past ten years, however, countries have begun to shift to theuse of
environmental taxes of some sort. In this section, we review thetypes of taxes that
are typically used and consider to what extent these taxes "hit thetarget.
As we noted above, the problem of targeting environmental taxesaccurately
in most cases follows from a difficulty in monitoring emissions. Thishas led
Eskeland and Devarajan (1996) to distinguish between "direct" and "indirect"
instruments to control pollution. Direct instruments requireknowledge of actual
emissions, while indirect instruments do not. A Pigouvian tax, as developed in
textbooks, is a tax on emissions themselves. The difficulty with direct taxes is that
monitoring emissions is technologically difficult and administratively complex.
Thus, most actual policies fall back on indirect approaches to reduceemissions; the
problem of hitting the target can be reframed as a problem of the administrative need
to use indirect instruments.
A. Air Pollution
A variety of taxes are employed around the world to combat airpollution.
Sweden applies a charge on actual Nitrous Oxide (NOr)emissionsof large heat and
power producers (final sale only) at a rate of roughly 40 Swedish Crowns per kg of
NO ($7.17 per kg) (OECD, 1994). For companies without emission measurement
equipment, standard emission rates (in grams of NO per Joule) exceed typical-5-
averageactual emissions. The higher assumed emission rate provides an incentive
for companies to install measurement equipment. Tax collections are rebated to
firms on the basis of final energy production. Thus the combination is revenue
neutral, as it provides a subsidy to low emitting firms and a tax on high emitting
firms. The Swedish experience suggests that technological limitations to the use of
directly targeted taxes may fall with technological progress. Moreover, this tax
provides an interesting example of allowing firms to choose whether to be subject to
a direct or an indirect tax. For firms that do not adopt monitoring equipment, the tax
becomes a tax on fuel consumption; the actual NO emissions are irrelevant.
Japan levies a charge on SO2 emissions, with the rate varying across regions.
The tax is based partly on historic emissions (1982-1986) and partly on emissions
from the previous year. The tax rate in 1992 was 124 yen/Nm3 for historic
emissions, and it was between 95and860 yen/Nm3 depending on the geographic
region in which emissions occurred (OECD, 1994). Allowing the rate to vary across
geographic region provides the possibility of linking the rate more closely to
marginal environmental damages. Whether Japan does in fact link the rates closely
to marginal environmental damages is a question beyond the scope of this paper.
Taxes on coal illustrate how technological differences can significantly affect
the ability to target emissions directly. A number of European countries levy a tax
on the sulfur content of various fuels. Norway levies a charge on the sulfur content
of oil. Sweden levies a charge on the sulfur content of oil, coal, and peat. A strict
sulfur-content tax is an indirect tax in that it does not require any monitoring of
emissions. It also does not provide any incentives to use scrubbers or otherwise
reduce sulfur emissions (other than by shifting from high to low sulfur content fuel).
Sweden rebates the tax to firms that can demonstrate significant reductions in SO2-6-
emissionsfrom the use of technologies such as flue gas cleaning. As of 1993,
Finland levied a tax differential between standard and sulfur-free oil.
A tax on carbon content can be viewed as a direct tax on CO2 emissions in
the sense that it is economically infeasible to alter the ratio of carbon emissions to
carbon content of the fuel in the industrial process.2 Thus, whatever carbon is
embodied in a fuel will be released to the atmosphere upon burning. As of 1992, six
OECD countries had either explicit or implicit carbon taxes (Denmark, Finland,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden). Most of the countries tax different sectors
at different rates, with some sectors exempted altogether. These taxes, to our
knowledge, do not provide any incentive for carbon scrubbing.
The Montreal Protocol of 1989 required the eventual phasing out of halons
and chiorofluorocarbons (CFC's). In the United States, Congress imposed taxes on
these ozone-depleting chemicals at the same time that it implemented quantity
regulations. The tax rate depends to some extent on the degree of ozone depletion.
Merrill and Rousso (1991) note that the purpose of this tax was to capture monopoly
rents arising from quantity restrictions. While the tax rate is not explicitly set equal
to social marginal damage, it is a direct tax in that these chemicals have a direct
relationship to the ozone depletion damage stemming from their use. They are
indirect and thus imprecisely targeted, however, in the sense that CFC emissions to
the atmosphere are assumed rather than measured. No distinction is made in the use
of CFCs regarding circumstances where release to the atmosphere is more or less
likely.-7-
B. Water Pollution
Taxes related to water pollution are of two general types: user charges for
sewage treatment and wastewater effluent charges. The latter is of more concern to
us than the former. Better targeted taxes would be based on "load," a measure of the
pollutants contained in the wastewater. It can be measured on an instantaneous basis
(so many parts per million) or on a flow basis (so many grams per hour or day).
Sewage treatment charges for households are based on water consumption rather
than load on the treatment plant, and so they serve as an indirect charge. Industry is
more likely to be metered with charges based on load. In 1992, for example,
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden all levied charges on firms based on
pollution loads exceeding some minimum amount.
In 1976, Germany implemented a water effluent charge for firms (to go into
effect in 1981), with different rates for different pollutants (e.g. Chemical Oxygen
Demand (COD) and heavy metals). Firms are taxed on the basis of "damage units,"
defined approximately as the amount of pollution generated by one individual.
Damage units are defined in terms of the amount of discharge of various pollutants.3
While the tax is a tax on emissions, certain features of the system make it more an
enforcement mechanism for technology standards. In particular, firms get a 75
percent reduction in rates if they can demonstrate compliance with specific
technology standards. Thus, the tax might be viewed as a tax on old technology
rather than on pollution. To the extent that the tax induces a shift to new, less
polluting technology, however, these standards may improve targeting relative to
standards that do not induce technology improvement.-8-
C. Solid and Hazardous Waste
The OECD distinguishes between municipal waste user charges and waste
disposal taxes. Municipal waste user charges may be collected as a flat rate, but they
are increasingly based on actual waste, and they are used to finance the cost of
collection and disposal. In contrast, waste disposal taxes generate revenues that
either go into the general budget or are earmarked for environmental expenditures
(e.g. subsidies for recycling). Since no effort is made to monitor the contents of
waste, any pollution to ground water from solid waste in a landfill does not affect the
charge to households or to firms producing the waste. In other words, these taxes
are indirect taxes with no incentive for shifting the composition of the waste stream.
As of 1992, five OECD countries had some form of tax that they characterize
as hazardous waste taxes. As the United States experience makes clear, these taxes
may be described only very loosely as taxes on hazardous waste. The United States
levies a number of Superfund taxes detailed in Fullerton (1996). These are taxes on
petroleum ($.097 per barrel) as well as on 42 organic and inorganic chemical
feedstocks --withrates ranging from $.22 to $4.87 per ton in 1992. The chemicals
to be taxed were chosen to some extent on the basis of their presence in hazardous
waste sites to be cleaned up under the Superfund law. In particular, the tax rates are
set to raise a specified sum necessary to clean up Superftind sites, where required
collections on oil and chemicals are based on their relative importance in waste sites.
These are indirect taxes at best, and, like many of the taxes discussed above, they do
not provide incentives for emissions reduction. They might reduce purchase of the
petroleum or chemical products, but they do not influence its handling, use, or
amount that becomes waste.-9-
For hazardous waste, the form of disposal affects the marginal environmental
damages quite dramatically. This fact suggests that a tax on the disposal of
hazardous waste could reduce welfare if it shifts the mode of disposal from safe,
monitored disposal sites to illegal dumping in unmonitored, unsecured sites. The
welfare impact of a tax on hazardous waste disposal will depend importantly on the
cost of monitoring disposal activities as well as the cost of enforcement and illegal
disposal activities. The more costly it is to monitor disposal activities and enforce
rules for proper disposal, the more likely it would be that a tax on hazardous waste
disposal would reduce welfare.
As of 1992, several countries levied taxes on the disposal of automobile
batteries (Canada, Denmark, Portugal, and Sweden) with differing rates based on the
type of battery. Some countries levy charges on waste oil disposal (Finland, France,
Italy, Norway, and the United States). Numerous countries levy charges on
packaging. Other taxes are levied on disposable diapers (Canada), car tires (Canada,
the United States), and plastic shopping bags (Italy).
D. Taxes on Products Associated With Pollution
Product taxes are indirect taxes by definition. As of 1992, ten OECD
countries levied some form of one-time sales tax differential on cars based on weight
(Canada), degree of compliance with emission standards (Belgium, Greece, Japan,
Netherlands, and Sweden), fuel efficiency (Canada, Japan, and the United States), or
the lack of a catalytic converter (Finland, Germany, and Norway).
In 1992 three OECD countries levied higher annual taxes on vehicles that
lack a catalytic converter (Austria and Denmark) and on average emissions for major
pollutants for each class of car (Germany). All OECD countries levy excise taxes on
gasoline. In addition, many OECD countries levy a higher tax on leaded than-10-
unleaded fuel. For example, Denmark, Finland, and Norway levied a surtax on
leaded fuel of $.11per liter in 1992.
E. Summary
This brief survey of environmental taxes suggests that few taxes anywhere
are precisely targeted taxes on emissions. The failure to target emissions precisely
may follow from significant costs associated with measuring emissions, from costs
associated with monitoring point and non-point source emissions at reasonable cost,
and —asa consequence —difficultieswith preventing tax evasion and illegal disposal
activities.4 To some extent, however, the imprecise targeting may result when
policymakers do not fully appreciate the costs of missing the target.
ifi. Prior Literature
The literature on environmental taxes is extensive. Most papers, however, do
not focus on the distinction between taxes on emissions and taxes on inputs or
outputs that are imperfectly correlated with emissions. In an early example that is
typical of this literature, Sandmo (1975) carries out an optimal tax exercise in the
presence of externalities. One of the consumption goods enters the utility function
directly as a negative externality. Because of the one-for-one relation between the
good itself and pollution, a tax on the good corresponds exactly to a tax on pollution.
If the good itself is associated with pollution, instruments to discourage pollution can
only operate through an output effect (as discussed above). Actually, the tax on
output can still perfectly correct for pollution associated with an input —ifoutput
must be produced using a fixed amount of pollution per unit.5 With substitution in
production, however, the output tax is no longer equivalent to a tax on pollution.
A recent paper by Cremer and Gahvari (1999) extends the Sandmo analysis
to allow for pollution to be associated with one of several inputs in production of a—11—
"dirtygood." In a standard optimal tax analysis, Cremer and Gahvari show first that
emissions taxes and output taxes are not equivalent and, second, that both emissions
and output taxes may be needed to achieve optimality in a second-best world. In
effect, the emissions tax corrects externalities while the output tax rates handle tax
collections for general revenue needs in an optimal fashion. While it is an important
extension to the original Sandmo analysis, the Cremer and Gahvari paper does not
consider the loss from using an output tax instead of an emissions tax. That is, it still
assumes that taxes on emissions are feasible.
A recent paper by Schmutzler and Goulder (1997) directly examines the
trade-off between the use of emissions taxes and output taxes in the presence of
imperfect monitoring of emissions. They note that previous authors (e.g. Cropper
and Oates, 1992) have recognized that output taxes may be preferable to emissions
taxes if emissions are difficult to monitor, and they attempt to make more precise
what it means to be "difficult to monitor." They enumerate four factors that affect
the choice between emission and output taxes: 1) monitoring costs, 2) technological
factors, 3) the regulator's information structure, and 4) social preferences for
consumption goods versus environmental quality. As the costs of monitoring
emissions rise, the advantage of precisely targeted emissions taxes falls. This effect
relates to evasion possibilities, as discussed in the previous section about hazardous
waste disposal taxes. Technological factors come into play by determining the scope
of substitution in production away from pollution. If emissions are a fixed
proportion of output, then an output tax would be equivalent to an emissions tax
without the need to measure emissions directly. The regulator's information
structure determines what it can monitor. Regulators face difficulty monitoring
emissions, but they may face even more difficulty trying to tax certain inputs or-12-
output (thereby affecting the relevant target). Finally, the loss from poorly-targeted
instruments is a loss in the value of output, while the loss from high cost of
monitoring may be a loss in environmental quality, so the trade-off in utility between
consumption and the environment may also affect the choice of instruments. The
paper by Smulders and Vollebergh (1999) presented at this conference explores
many similar issues.
Policy can miss the target in another important sense that we note here but do
not pursue in this paper. In the presence of multiple pollutants, targeting one
pollutant may cause substitution out of that pollutant and into other pollutants.
Devlin and Grafion (1994) explore this topic in the context of determining the
optimal number of tradable permits for a pollutant when multiple pollutants co-
exist.6
All of these papers ignore general equilibrium considerations. A large
literature starting with Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) explores the welfare
consequences of environmental taxes and other instruments in a general equilibrium
context with pre-existing taxes.7 These papers have typically focused on the
interactions among taxes rather than on the issue of emissions taxes versus output
taxes (or otherwise imperfectly targeted taxes). In the model that we present below,
we allow for general equilibrium considerations as well as the existence of other
distorting taxes.8 We turn now to that model.
lv. A General Equilibrium Model of Production and Consumption
The review of environmental taxes in the previous section indicates a slow
movement away from output taxes toward emissions taxes. Having said that, the
predominant existing environmental taxes still miss the target in that they tax a
purchased input to production or an output sold, but not emissions per Se. In this-13-
section,we carry out a general equilibrium analysis of the costs and effects of using
mistargeted environmental instruments. The model allows us to investigate the
welfare effects of a commodity or emissions tax in a second-best world with a pre-
existing labor distortion. We allow for choices in production and consumption,
using the same notation as in Fullerton and Metcalf (1997). The model has a
homogeneous population (of size N) and the possibility to substitute inputs in
production. We assume perfect competition, complete information, and perfect
factor mobility. The model has a clean good (X) and a dirty good (Y) which is
produced using labor (Ly) and emissions (Z).
A number of policies can be analyzed with this model. We can solve for the
optimal second-best tax rate (either on emissions, Z, or on output, Y) as a function
of preference and production parameters as well as pre-existing tax rates. In
addition, we can consider various incremental tax reforms. With respect to the latter,
we consider the four possible scenarios listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Policy Experiments
1. Pre-existing tax on Y only
A. increase tax on Y
B. new tax on Z
2. Pre-existing tax on Z only
A. new tax on Y
B. increase tax on Z
Most actual taxes fall into category 1, as noted in our review above, and the relevant
policy reform is either an increase in one of these taxes or the introduction of a new-14-
more-targeted tax. Taxes on gasoline are an output tax, for example, so proposals in
the United States to increase the gasoline tax would be an example of scenario 1 A.
On the other hand, proposals for a new carbon tax in the context of current taxes on
gasoline would be an example of scenario lB. As an example of a pre-existing tax
on emissions, a carbon tax was implemented in the Scandinavian countries in the
early 1990s. Policy reforms to implement new taxes in those countries on goods
associated with pollution would be examples of scenario 2A, while proposals to
increase the carbon taxes would be examples of scenario 2B. We begin by
developing the model in the case with pre-existing taxes on either emissions or
output, but we first consider only an incremental tax on output (ty).
A. Production
The clean good is produced in a constant returns to scale technology using
only labor (Lx) as an input:9
(1) X=L
For convenience, the numeraire is taken to be labor (or equivalently the clean good).
The dirty good (Y) is produced in a constant returns to scale production function
using labor (Ly)andemissions (Z):
(2) Y =F(Ly,Z)
Also, emissions entail some private cost in terms of resources (labor), and we can
define a unit of emissions as the amount that requires one unit of resources:10
(3) ZLz
Aggregate emissions adversely affect environmental quality:
(4) E=e(NZ) e'<O
Finally, a public good is produced using labor:
(5) G=NLG-15-
The amount of this public good is held constant in revenue-neutral reforms below.
B. Consumption
In this model, the N identical households derive utility from the two private
goods (X and Y), leisure (LH), the public good (G), and environmental quality (E):
(6) U =U(X,Y, LH; G, E)
The household budget constraint is given by
(7) X + (py + ty)Y =(1-tL)L
where
(8) L =Lx+ L +L + Lc,.
Governmentfinances the public good with a pre-existing tax on labor income (tL)
and possibly a tax on output (ty). The nominal net wage is l-tL. A fixed amount of
time (L) can be allocated between work (L) and leisure (LH).
C. Comparative Statics
Below, we consider the effect of changing various prices through the use of
taxes. We employ a log-linearization technique for the analysis, an approach that is
appropriate when considering small changes. This technique allows us to capture
important behavioral attributes of producers and consumers with a few key
parameters. It also makes for a tractable analysis by allowing us to solve a system of
linear equations. The goal in this section is to develop the various equations that
trace through the impacts of a tax change on prices, quantities, and welfare. We




wheredU is the change in a representative agent's utility and X is the private
marginal utility of income. The term .t equals -NUEe'/2and is the marginal-16-
social damage from pollution. A hat over a variable indicates a percentage change
(e.g. Z =dZ/Z).The left hand side of this expression is the change in welfare (in
dollars) as a fraction of the total resource in the economy. The right hand side is
composed of three parts. The first two parts are the welfare effect of the
environmental policy through its impact on labor supply and the amount of the dirty
good. Since labor is already discouraged as a result of the tax on wage income, any
policy that further discourages labor supply will reduce welfare. A similar effect
holds for any pre-existing tax on the dirty good. If either tL or ty is zero, the
corresponding welfare effect on labor or the dirty good disappears from the equation.
The third term is the welfare impact resulting from the change in pollution.
In order to find tractable solutions to the welfare equation in (9), we make
some simplifying assumptions on consumer preferences. In particular, we assume
that environmental quality and the public good are separable from the consumption
goods and that the consumption goods enter utility in a homothetic sub-utility
function'2:
(10) U(X,Y,LH,E,G) =U(V(Q(X,Y),LH),E,G)
where V and Qareboth homothetic. For later use, define p as a price index on
Q(X,Y) such that
(11) DQQ X + (py + ty)Y
and let w be the real net wage,
(12) w =(l-tL)/pQ.
Thus the change in the real net wage ('i dw / w) will be related to the change in
the labor tax (iL' defined as dtJJ(1-tL)) and the change in p (dpQ/pQ).
From (11), the change in p depends on the change in the producer price py and-17-
the change in the output tax (dt1(1 + tv)). Finally, let cy be the consumer
price for Y
(13) cypy+ty
Our assumptions on consumer preferences allow us to characterize the





In these equations, is the elasticity of substitution in consumption between X
and Y, c is the uncompensated labor supply elasticity, and 4isthe share of the
consumer's after-tax income spent on Y. Equations (14) and (15) follow directly
from our definition of YQ and our assumptions on consumer preferences. Equation
(16) follows from totally differentiating equation (12) and using equation (11), while
equation (17) follows from differentiating the consumer's budget constraint.
We totally differentiate the government budget constraint, hold G fixed, and
assume that the revenue from the change in ty is offset by a change in tL. These
assumptions provide the fifth equation in our system:
(18) =tL - tZ-[î +1 L1-tL) L(1-tL)L)[L1+t)
This is the change in tL necessary for government to balance the budget when
changing ty. Next, we turn to the equations implied by production. As yet, we do
not allow for a change in the tax on emissions. Thus any change in inputs or output-18-
comesentirely from an output effect. Because of constant returns to scale in
production, we have
(19) Y=Z=L
Also, the producer price is fixed,'3 and so
(20)
Equations (14)-(20) represent eight linear equations that can be solved for the eight
variables (Y, IX i, tL, ,L,L, and ),allas functions of the exogenous
After we solve for changes in Y, L, and Z as functions of the change in
ty, we substitute these expressions into equation (9) and express the welfare change








Despite the complexity of this equation, we can make some general
observations about the welfare impact of an incremental tax reform. First, note that
the welfare impact does not depend on the ability to substitute out of emissions in
production (ay). Since we have limited our instrument to a tax on the dirty output,
the only welfare gain comes about from an equilibrium output effect (arising from
substitution in consumption). The change in the output tax provides no substitution
effect in production.
Second, the first term in the denominator must be positive to ensure that the
government is on the upward sloping side of the Laffer curve for wage taxation. We
will assume that this is always the case. A condition for the entire denominator to be
positive is for s < (NL-G)/G, or that E be bounded above by the ratio of private-19-
output to government output.'5 We will also assume that this condition holds
throughout.
Third, note that the formula simplifies considerably with no pre-existing
taxes:
(21')
Welfare is unambiguously increased by an initial output tax, so long as consumers
can substitute from Y to X.16
Next we turn to a model for the case where the policy shock is a change in
the tax on emissions rather than on output. The relevant equations (14) and (15) are
unchanged, and other equations change as noted by primes:
(14) Y—X—Q(pXcY)—cQcY
(15)
(16') W =- tL1(1+ t )Z
(1— tL )L)
(17') (1-=L-L








Equations (19.1') and (19.2') require a bit of explanation. The first equation is the
behavioral relationship in production given by the elasticity of substitution in
production (y).Thenthe second equation follows from the first order conditions in
production.
Combining these equations and using the zero profits condition, we can solve







(1+ tY)[(1 -tLctL) (1+ c)tJ + tZJJ]
Z
The top term in the numerator of equation (22) is very similar to the whole
numerator in equation (21) and reflects substitution in consumption (that is, the
effect on output). The second term in the numerator reflects the substitution effect in
production, as we now have the possibility of changing relative input prices. With
no pre-existing taxes of any kind, the expression simplifies to
(22') = — 4)1-J +
The first term in equation (22') corresponds to equation (21'), adjusted for the fact
that the tax is on emissions rather than output. It represents the output effect from
the emissions tax. In addition, a substitution effect is captured by the second term.-21-
V. Model Analysis
A. Optimal Tax Rates
We begin the analysis by considering the optimal tax in the various scenarios
described above. First consider the optimal emissions tax in the case with a pre-
existing tax on labor but no tax on output. This is, we ask what is the tax tz in
equation (22), where ty 0, such that no further change canaffect welfare
(dUO). We set equation (22) to zero and solve for the tax rate on emissions:
(23) 4
Unlessthe tax rate tL or the uncompensated labor supply elasticity is zero, the term
in brackets is less than one, and the optimal emissions tax is less than the social
marginal damages (4<ii).This result is consistent with Bovenberg and de Mooij
(1994).
To see how our expression (23) relates to other results in the literature, let 'F
be the partial-equilibrium marginal cost of public funds for the labor tax. Goulder




Then some simple manipulation of this formula provides
(25) =['- JI
Withpositive tax rate and positive labor supply elasticity c, the marginal cost of
funds is 'EF>1 .Thusequation (23) can be rewritten as-22-
(23') t=--,
w
asnoted by Sandmo (1975) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1996).'
Analogously, if the emissions tax is unavailable (tzO), we can solve for the
second-best tax on output as the ty in (21) such that a change idoesnot raise
welfare (dUO). We set the numerator of equation (21) to zero and find:
(26) t. =(.J(J
Astriking result is that the optimal tax on output is so similar to the optimal tax on
emissions.'8 This tax is "second-best" in two respects. First, this ty is reduced
when divided by 1P>1, to account for the pre-existing tax on labor. Second, one
might think that it should be reduced even more, to account for missing the target.
The output tax is a blunt instrument for dealing with pollution. On the other hand,
perhaps ty should be increased to get more of an output effect since it misses the
substitution effect. Yet equation (26) shows that the output tax should be set to
generate exactly the same output effect as the ideal emissions tax. To see this, note
that the second best emissions tax (t*Z =Ww)wouldraise production costs by (Ww)Z.
Divide this amount by Y to get the extra cost per unit of output, which is exactly
the amount that t. would raise the price of output.'9
In other words, the fact that the output tax cannot achieve the desired
substitution effect should not deter policymakers from its use to achieve the desired
output effect. The optimal tis the damage per unit of output --calculatedas the
desired the tax per unit of emissions (t) times emissions per unit output (Z/Y).-23-
If the ideal t*Z were unavailable, could the authorities set tty and enforce it?
If firms differ, one might think that authorities would need to know each firm's Z
(or equivalently Z/Y) to set that firm's output tax rate using equation (26). Yet, if
authorities knew Z, it seems they could employ an emissions tax directly. However,
authorities only need to measure (or estimate) Z/Y once to set the output tax rate.
The tax can then be enforced simply by counting units of output. In contrast, the
emissions tax requires continuous measurement of Z, especially after firms change
their Z/Y ratio in response to the tax. Moreover, if firms are similar, authorities
only need the average Z/Y to set the output tax rate. Even if firms are similar, the
emissions tax requires authorities to measure (or at least threaten to measure) each
firm's emissions.
Next, consider the possibility of pre-existing taxes either on emissions or on
output. Equation (26) generalizes readily in the presence of a pre-existing tax on Z:
(27) t; =1")1')—
LwAY)LY
The first term in (27) is the output effect from the optimal output tax if tz were zero.
The second term adjusts the tax rate to account for the output effect already obtained
from taxing emissions. If the emissions tax is fixed suboptimally, then the
additional required output tax is simply the additional desired output effect to
account for the undertaxation of emissions. If emissions are taxed optimally (tz
equals 'Jw).then(27) shows that the optimal tax on output is zero.
To find the optimal tax on emissions (tZ*) in the case of a pre-existing tax on
output, we find the tax rate on emissions that cannot raise utility. That is, we find tz
in equation (22) such that dU=O. The solution to this equation is more complicated:-24-
Q(1 —4)(1 +t)Z[(1— tL)(tYY+ (t —i)Z)+ctLz]
(28) + aL(1 + t)[(1 —tL)(tz
—)Z+ [tL + (1 + E)t(_)JIiZ] =o




(1— tL )(OQ (1—4)(1+ t)Z +oL(1+tv))
While we have not explicitly solved for the optimal emissions tax (since tz appears
on both sides), we can show that the right hand side is less than zero. Thus the
optimal emissions tax rate is less than social marginal damages (t <j.t), with pre-
existing ty and tL. A sufficient condition for the emissions tax rate to equal social
marginal damages is thatand ty both equal zero.20 Note that if either the tL or
E is zero (so 1), then ty non-zero still means that the optimal tax on emissions is
less than p..
For the special case where Y =Zand y =0,equation (28) collapses to
(28") t. +t
'If
Inthis case, we need not distinguish between taxes on emissions or output, since the
production function is such that output itself is polluting. Once again, the optimal
tax is marginal social damages divided by the marginal cost of public funds.
B. Incremental Tax Reforms-25-
We now turn to a numerical analysis of tax reforms. We measure the impact
on welfare of a small change in either tz or ty. In order to carry out these
calculations, we need values for a number of key parameters. Table 2 presents the
assumed values for our base case calculations; justification for these selections











Little evidence exists on some of these parameters, especially o and y, and
so we present sensitivity analysis in the next section. Also, marginal environmental
damages (p) could be considerably higher for some pollutants (and lower for others).
Tax rate results are proportional to .t, however, so it is easy to see how results
change with that parameter.
Consider Scenario 1, with no pre-existing tax on emissions but with a pre-
existing tax on labor and (perhaps) on output. With these values, the first-best
Pigouvian tax would be p.=0.3, but the marginal cost of funds is w=1.25sothe
second-best tax on emissionsis 0.24 (from equation 23'). Then, since emissions
constitute half of output, equation (26) says that the second-best tax on output is 12
percent. For our measure of welfare, we use dU/?.L, the monetary value of the
change in utility as a fraction of total income.-26-
Figure 1 depicts the general welfare effects of a small change in either the
output tax or the emission tax, assuming no pre-existing emissions tax, for
alternative values of a pre-existing output tax. The horizontal axis indicates the level
of the output tax prior to the reform, and the vertical axis shows the net change in
welfare as a proportion of national income. The absolute welfare change may be in
billions of dollars, but dividing by GDP makes the relative gains look small on the
vertical axis. Consider the lower dashed line, which indicates the change in welfare
for a change in ty. First note that it crosses the horizontal axis at ty =.12.Since the
optimal output tax with this configuration of parameters is .12, welfare does not
change when the tax rate is altered from this level. At tax rates below this optimum,
welfare rises when the tax on Y is increased a small amount. The maximum gain
occurs with no pre-existing tax on output.2' The line falls below the horizontal axis
in the region where ty exceeds 12 percent, indicating that a further increase in the
tax rate would reduce welfare.
The solid line shows the welfare gain from introducing a small emissions tax.
First, note that this line is everywhere above the line for raising the output tax. For
any pre-existing tax on output, welfare is raised more by introducing a tax on
emissions than by increasing the tax on output. Recall that the major distinguishing
difference is that the emissions tax provides both output and substitution effects
while the output tax only provides an output effect. As an approximation, then, the
substitution effect is the gap between these two lines. With no initial taxes, the
welfare gain from a small output tax is less than half that of a small emissions tax:
more than half of the gain from an emissions tax comes from the shift in production
processes as emissions become more expensive. This decomposition depends-27-
directly on y, because the crucial distinction between an output tax and emissions
tax is the ability of the latter to operate through the substitution effect. Below, we
provide some sensitivity analysis on this parameter.
Second, the welfare gain from introducing an emissions tax is everywhere
positive. At high pre-existing output tax rates, the additional output effect reduces
welfare, but the initial substitution effect from the first introduction of tz is
sufficiently strong to overwhelm any negative output effect.
Figure 2 corresponds to Scenario 2 (no pre-existing output tax). The
horizontal axis now indicates the level of a pre-existing emissions tax. The optimal
emissions tax for this set of parameter assumptions is 24 percent, so the solid line
measuring the incremental gains from an incremental emissions tax crosses the
horizontal axis at 0.24 (where welfare cannot be raised by any change in tz).
Interestingly, the output tax curve also crosses the horizontal axis at 24 percent. In
other words, if the pre-existing emissions tax is already at the second-best optimal
rate of 0.24, then the initial introduction of ty has no first order effect on welfare.
Back at the vertical axis, where the initial ty and tz are both zero, the introduction
of an initial tz dominates the introduction of an initial ty (since tz has both
substitution and output effects). In other words, the "Emissions Tax" curve starts out
higher than the "Output Tax" curve, and they must both cross the horizontal axis at
0.24 (the second-best optimum). If the emissions tax rate exceeds the second-best
optimum, a further increase in this tax is more welfare reducing than an increase in
the output effect, since the increase in the emissions tax has both an unwanted
substitution effect as well as an unwanted output effect.-28-
C. Sensitivity Analysis
The first two figures are drawn using one set of preference parameters and
technological parameters. Clearly, however, the size of the substitution effect
depends on the elasticity of substitution in production (y), and the size of the output
effect depends on consumer demand (the elasticity of substitution in utility, cQ).We
vary those parameters in Figures 3 and 4, but we still show the effect of missing the
target --the"welfare gap" --definedas the gain from adding a tax on emissions
minus the gain from adding to the tax on output.
Figure 3 shows this welfare gap (on the vertical axis) for different values of
the elasticity of substitution in utility (on the horizontal axis). The three curves in
the figure correspond to three initial values of ty (0.0, 0.12, and 0.24). Since c
most directly affects the output effect, and not the substitution effect, it does not
much affect the cost of missing the target. When the initial tax rate is 12 percent or
lower, the welfare gain from the emissions tax exceeds the gain from the output tax
by a relatively constant amount. At higher levels of pre-existing ty, a higher cYQ
raisesthis amount.
Figure 4 shows the welfare gap for different values of the elasticity of
substitution in production (again for initial ty equal to 0.0, 0.12, or 0.24). The
assumed value of ay clearly affects the size of the welfare gap. For any initial tax
on output, the ability to substitute in production dramatically increases the
importance of hitting the target.
VI. Conclusion
A tax on pollution has been suggested by Pigou (1932) and thoroughly
analyzed in the economics literature ever since, but a true Pigouvian tax is-29-
essentially never employed by actual policy. Most actual environmental taxes apply
to the output of a polluting industry or to an input that is correlated with emissions,
rather than directly to emissions. Perhaps policymakers think that the "polluter pays
principle" is satisfied, since the polluters bear the burden of the output tax, butthis
paper shows the loss in welfare from missing the targetin this fashion. Using
plausible parameters, the introduction of a tax on emissions raises welfare by more
than twice as much as a tax on output of the polluting industry. We find that the
ability of producers to substitute away from emissions directly affects the costof
missing the target, but it does not affect the second-best optimal tax on output. In
the case where emissions cannot be taxed, perhaps for technological reasons, we find
that the second-best output tax should still be set to obtain the same effect on output
price as would occur with the desired but unavailable emissions tax.
Other research directions are not explored in this paper but represent
important avenues for further study. First of all, we ignore the administrative costof
trying to monitor emissions. If the ability to measure and tax emissions is a matter
of degree, then we would expect a tradeoff at the margin between the falling
marginal benefits of hitting closer to the target versus the rising marginal costsof
doing so. The optimum might then involve some optimal degree of effort to
measure and tax emissions.
Second, our model considers a tax on output of the polluting industry, for
comparison with the ideal emissions tax, but some of the actual environmental taxes
apply to an input to production that is correlated with pollution. To analyzesuch a
tax, our model would have to be modified such that the polluting industry usesthree
inputs to production: labor, emissions, and some other input that iscorrelated to
emissions.-30-
Third, our model is rather stylized, with one clean output, one dirty output,
and one very-general technology of switching from emissions to the other input in
production. Our results are valuable for conceptual understanding of the importance
of hitting the target, but specific policy problems should be analyzed for particular
industries with carefully-specified technologies of pollution abatement.
Fourth, as indicated in our review of actual taxes above, some programs may
allow the firm to choose between paying an output tax or purchasing abatement and
monitoring equipment to pay a lower emissions tax. In addition, waste taxes may be
earmarked for public spending on abatement. Hazardous waste taxes may increase
illegal, unmonitored activities.
Finally, we note that our model relies on many other standard simplifying
assumptions and thus could be extended to consider effects of uncertainty, imperfect
competition, heterogeneity among firms, distributional effects among consumers,
traded goods, transboundry pollution, and many other interesting problems.-31-
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Roughlyspeaking, market-based instruments may be either price-based or
quantity-based instruments. Taxes are a form of price-based instrument, while
tradable permits are a quantity-based instrument. This paper compares different
kinds of taxes, while Fullerton and Metcalf (1997) use a similar model to consider
quantity instruments.
2Processesfor carbon scrubbing are described in Astarita et al (1983), but these
technologies generate such a vast amount of solid waste (e.g. carbonic acid or forms
of carbonates) that disposal costs become prohibitive. Sulfur scrubbing, on the other
hand, involves a small amount of sulfur per ton of coal (or barrel of oil) and so does
not lead to such significant sulfur disposal problems.
The following amounts of effluents (in addition to others not listed) each add up to
one damage unit: 50kgof organic matter (COD), 3 kg of phosphorus, or 1 kg of
copper and copper compounds (Anderson and Lohof 1997).
The paper by Siniscalco et al (1999) at this conference discusses the possibilities of
voluntary compliance with pollution control rules.
See, for example, the recent paper by Sandmo and Wildasin (1999). This
statement is true so long as emissions per unit of output are constant across firms.
Nichols (1984) notes that the cost of using an output tax rather than an emissions tax
rise with variation across firms in the emissions to output ratio (even if this ratio is
fixed for each firm). Nichols also notes that targeting emissions per se is not
precisely correct, as the tax should distinguish among emissions according to their-40-
marginal damages. This point justifies, for example, time-varying emissions taxes
where marginal damages vary during the day.
6Asimilar idea was analyzed by Metcalf Dudek, and Willis (1984) who consider
the effect of controlling one form of disposal medium for a pollutant in a situation
with multiple disposal media.
'Avery partial list includes Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), Parry (1995), Goulder
(1995), Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw (1997), and Fullerton and Metcalf (1997). This
literature is surveyed in Fullerton and Metcalf (1998).
8Thepaper by Schmutzler and Goulder (1997) is closest in spirit to our paper.
Their analysis is explicitly partial equilibrium, however, and they do not consider
other pre-existing tax distortions.
Our model assumes one factor of production, for simplicity called "labor," but
under some circumstances this factor can be taken to represent a homogeneous
composite of all clean resources used in production.
10Notethat emissions are positively related to the use of these resources: Lz is not
to clean up or reduce emissions, but just to cart it away. Abatement is undertaken by
substituting away from Z and into L .Thisoverall production function is still
constant returns to scale, since Z is a linear function of L .Theprivate cost for
emissions helps justify our assumption of an internal solution with a finite choice for
Z, even without corrective government policy. 'Thisequation follows from totally differentiating the utility function and
substituting in the consumer's first order conditions. Details are available from the
authors.-41-
12 Theassumption of separability is standard in this second-best taxliterature
because it is tractable and because it is a central case with neither complements nor
differential substitutes. We only have two private goods (X and Y). With more
disaggregation, particular private goods would undoubtedly be complements to
leisure, or to the environment, and receive unique tax treatments for those reasons.
13 We normalize the initialproducer price of Y to be one, for any given emissions
tax. In this section, where we do not allow for the emissions tax to change, the
producer price will be unaffected by changes in the output tax.
14 Detailsare available upon request from the authors.
15 This follows from the fact thatgovernment spending is financed entirely by
taxes: GINtLL+tzZ+tyY.
16 Theoutput effect disappears if Qequalszero, because then consumers do not
substitute X for Y when the latter's price rises. In addition, if 4equals0 or 1,
then the consumer is at a corner and again does not substitute X for Y (note that 4
= 0implies Z 0).
17 This result is also consistent with Cremer and Gahvari(1999). They solve for
optimal second-best tax rates on emissions and on outputs in the general case
without separability, but in our case with separability, their emissions tax would be
pii and their output tax would be zero (using tL for revenue).
18 For thespecial case where Y=Z, equation (26) collapses to (23').
19Actually, the optimal ty in (26) uses the Z/Ywithoutany tz, without any
substitution effect, so that Z/Y is higher than the optimal Z/Y. The "rule" in (26)-42-
gives the same output effect, but the "level" of t*y in (26) is higher than the output
effect of tz (at optimal Z/Y).
20Alternatively, the optimal tax rate equals .t if ty and tL are zero (that is, a first
best world).
21 It istempting to integrate under this curve to measure the welfare impact of a
large change in ty, say from zero to 12 percent. This would be a legitimate exercise
if the private marginal utility of income were constant across this interval. In
general ? is not constant, however, so the increments to welfare are measured in
different units of income and are not additive.